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W.G. Sebald’s final novel Austerlitz is often framed as a work of “postmemorial” 
Holocaust fiction. While trauma theory has generated valuable insights about the novel, 
its emphasis on witnessing (or failing to bear witness) tends to elide other important 
aspects of the text, most notably the careful attention Austerlitz brings to bear on physical 
things, spaces, and structures. This essay draws on recent work in object-oriented 
philosophy to suggest a new theoretical framework for reading Sebald’s last novel. 
Taking Austerlitz’s meticulous descriptions of the physical world as my starting point, I 
trace how the text cultivates what Jane Bennett calls a “vital materialism,” or a theory of 
matter that attends to the vitality of nonhuman objects. Instead of reading ‘through’ these 
descriptions for what goes unrepresented (“the main scenes of horror,” in Sebald’s 
phrase), I examine how the novel’s attention to physical surfaces troubles the distinction 
between material things and immaterial processes like subjectivity, memory, and 
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From the outset my main concern was with the 
shape and the self-contained nature of discrete 
things, the curve of banisters on a staircase, the 
molding of a stone arch over a gateway, the 
tangled precision of the blades in a tussock of 
dried grass. I took hundreds of such photographs 
at Stower Grange, most of them in square 
format, but it never seemed right to me to turn 
the viewfinder of my camera on people. In my 
photographic work I was always especially 
entranced, said Austerlitz, by the moment when 
the shadows of reality, so to speak, emerge out 
of nothing on the exposed paper, as memories do 
in the middle of the night, darkening again if 
you try to cling to them, just like a photographic 
print left in the developing bath too long.  
 
— W.G. Sebald, Austerlitz 
 
Introduction 
 In the passage above, Jacques Austerlitz, the title character of W.G. Sebald’s final 
novel Austerlitz, is reflecting on his early experiments with photography. His meditations 
on his own photographic practice, though, would serve equally well as a description of 
the text he inhabits. Austerlitz shares its protagonist’s decided preference for “discrete 
things” over people. Its landscapes and city scenes are populated largely by objects, 
ranging from train stations to knickknacks, archival documents to ruins. Since its 
publication in 2001, Sebald’s text has generated a rich body of critical literature in fields 
as diverse as architectural history, translation studies, and photography theory. Austerlitz 
is often framed as a work of “postmemorial” Holocaust fiction, the story of a middle-
aged architectural historian’s attempts to come to grips with the events that claimed the 
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lives of his Jewish parents and severed the link to his own early history.1 As J.J. Long 
notes, trauma theory remains one of the predominant critical frameworks for reading the 
text (Fuchs and Long 16-18).2 While this approach has generated valuable insights about 
the novel, trauma theory’s emphasis on witnessing (or failing to bear witness) tends to 
elide other important aspects of the text, most notably the careful attention it brings to 
bear on physical things, spaces, and structures.3  
 This essay draws on recent work in object-oriented philosophy to suggest a new 
theoretical framework for reading Sebald’s last novel. As Austerlitz travels to archives, 
museums, and historical sites in the novel, searching for evidence of his family, he must 
continually renegotiate the relationship between the fragility of memory and the solidity 
of its objects—a division that, like a photographic image left in the developing bath, 
becomes less clearly defined the longer he clings to it. Taking Austerlitz’s meticulous 
descriptions of the physical world as my starting point, I trace how the text cultivates 
what Jane Bennett calls a “vital materialism,” or a theory of matter that attends to the 
vitality of nonhuman objects (Bennett 16). Instead of reading ‘through’ these descriptions 
for what goes unrepresented (“the main scenes of horror,” in Sebald’s phrase), I examine 
how Austerlitz’s attention to physical surfaces troubles the distinction between material 
things and immaterial processes like subjectivity, memory, and affective response 
                                                
1 Marianne Hirsch defines “postmemory” as “the relationship of the second generation to powerful, often 
traumatic, experiences that preceded their births but that were nevertheless transmitted to them so 
deeply as to seem to constitute memories in their own right” (The Generation of Postmemory 103). 
2 Long’s “Bibliographical Essay” in W.G. Sebald and the Writing of History (2007) provides a useful 
overview of major trends in Sebald criticism, in both German and English, up to 2007.  
3 Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, for example, describe the Holocaust as “the unprecedented, 
inconceivable, historical occurrence of ‘an event without witness’—an event eliminating its own 
witness” (Felman and Laub xvii), while Cathy Caruth argues that trauma demands “the witnessing, 
precisely, of impossibility” (Caruth 1995, 10). 
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(Sebald, The Emergence of Memory 80).   
 As Bennett and countless others have observed, the mind/matter binary undergirds 
multiple forms of exploitation and violence, including those forms of structural or 
systemic violence that are, for Sebald, a defining feature of modernity. Engaging with the 
ongoing effects of such violence demands not only different forms of representation, but 
also other ways of conceptualizing the relationship between our present moment and 
traumatic histories that are not yet safely ‘past.’ It also means rethinking what forms of 
historical engagement are possible or, indeed, desirable. While Austerlitz’s meticulous 
descriptions of things, spaces, and structures have struck many readers as affectively thin 
or flat, lacking the emotional depth or the degree of humanity we expect from Holocaust 
literature, I read this flatness as a deliberate repudiation of a testimony-based model of 
historical witness.4 In rejecting what Heather Love calls the “empathetic witness model,” 
Austerlitz must develop other methods for putting the reader into contact with 
modernity’s incredible capacity for engineering destruction. Viewed in this light, we 
might understand Sebald’s ‘surface readings’ not as a failure to get beyond the surface to 
the depths, but as part of an alternative archival practice—one that facilitates, in turn, 
different modes of ethical engagement. 
 
                                                
4 Ruth Franklin critiques Sebald’s “disengagement” from the events he describes, arguing that this distance 
“amounts to an aestheticizing of catastrophe” (The Emergence of Memory 138). In the same essay, 
Franklin cites a piece by Dieter Forte published in the German periodical Der Spiegel, in which Forte 
argues that Sebald “prefers the indirect method, the clear reports, the clarity of calm observation; he 
remains distant from the actual horror” (137).  
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A Different Kind of Object 
 
 Austerlitz frames itself as a series of reconstructed conversations between an 
unnamed German narrator and Jacques Austerlitz, an itinerant scholar obsessed with the 
“architectural style of the capitalist era” (Sebald, Austerlitz 33). Beginning with their first 
encounter in Antwerp’s Centraal Station in 1967 and ending with their final meeting in 
Paris in 1997, the novel chronicles the development of a relationship that is at once 
extraordinarily intimate and curiously detached, marked by long gaps in communication 
and renewed by chance encounters in unlikely places. Initially, the narrator says, it was 
“almost impossible to talk to [Austerlitz] about anything personal”—for, incredibly, 
Austerlitz’s extraordinarily wide-ranging knowledge does not extend to twentieth century 
history, including his own: “As far as I was concerned the world ended in the nineteenth 
century” (140). Separated from his Czech Jewish parents and sent to Wales as part of the 
Kindertransport program just prior to the war, Austerlitz grew up in complete ignorance 
of his previous life. It is only in middle age, after experiencing a strange revelation in a 
train station, that he begins to seek out the truth about his origins. 
Large sections of the novel are given over to descriptions and photographs of the 
things, structures, and spaces that Austerlitz encounters as he travels to various sites and 
archives associated with the Holocaust. The grainy, black-and-white images reproduced 
in the text, ostensibly created or gathered by Austerlitz himself, represent only a small 
fragment of a much vaster archive: his scholarly researches on “the architectural style of 
the capitalist era,” an undertaking that has long since “outstripped [its] original purpose 
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as a project for a dissertation, proliferating in his hands into endless preliminary 
sketches” (33). The forms of observation and information collection Austerlitz practices 
in his ‘fieldwork’ are general, in the sense that they can be applied to nearly any object, 
and generative, in terms of the volume of material they produce, yet they have a 
relentlessly exteriorizing effect on the observer himself. In fact, Austerlitz’s mind often 
seems less like a narrative consciousness than a complex but narrowly defined 
information system, designed to collect and store massive amounts of historical data 
without situating this information in relation to his own first person perspective. Though 
he has devoted most of his adult life to amassing information about the structures and 
spaces he occupies, Austerlitz’s mental and emotional life is rigidly delineated by the 
data collection systems he has fine-tuned since his early student years. As J.J. Long 
writes, Austerlitz “never materializes as a subject in possession of a full interiority,” 
remaining “in effect external to himself” even as he attempts to reconstruct the narrative 
of his early history (Long, Image Archive Modernity 163, 171).  
 If Austerlitz is not quite a subject, nor are the physical things and structures 
described in the novel quite ‘objects,’ at least in the conventional sense of the word. 
Austerlitz, I contend, is fascinated by what Bennett calls “thing-power”—the capacities of 
nonhuman objects to disrupt, diverge from, and ultimately complicate our ability to speak 
of, a purely human history (Bennett xvi). Bennett’s work on vital materialism reflects a 
growing interdisciplinary interest in what is loosely known as “object-oriented theory.” 
Informed by a variety of theoretical precursors, among them Baruch Spinoza and Gilles 
Deleuze, object-oriented thinkers share a desire to rethink dominant theories of 
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materiality in an effort to reconfigure a seemingly intractable subject-object divide. For 
the purposes of this paper, I focus on two key tenets of object-oriented thought: first, the 
idea that there is “a vitality intrinsic to materiality,” and second, that recognizing this 
vitality would necessitate an expanded definition of the ‘object’—one that would treat 
ideas, affects, and fictions as entities in themselves, varying from physical entities not in 
essential substance, but in their degree of intensity (Bennett 3). 
 In his book The Democracy of Objects, the philosopher Levi Bryant writes that 
post-Kantian Western philosophy has overwhelmingly privileged issues of how humans 
perceive and interact with the world (Democracy of Objects 16). By elevating questions 
of access (epistemology) over questions of being (ontology), Western thought has 
effectively divided up the world into subjects and objects, split between the human actor 
or agent and the nonhuman element (the raw, passive ‘stuff’ upon which agents work). 
From this perspective, objects exist for me and through me alone: it is the “I”—alive, 
vibrant, and possessed of a singular agency—who animates dead matter, invests it with 
meaning, and, ultimately, conditions its very existence. No thing can be said to exist 
outside the scope of my own thought; and my thought can only encompass that which 
currently exists in some relation to me. Object-oriented ontology rejects this construction, 
dubbed “correlationism.” Instead, OOO presumes a flat ontology, which holds that all 
things exist equally—independent of human perception, or of their relations to other 
objects.  
 It is at this point that the term ‘object’ becomes somewhat problematic, as it is 
difficult for us to think an object that is not already in some relation to a subject. Another 
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issue is that for most people, ‘object’ implies a physical thing: something produced or 
discovered, available for us to pick up or manipulate. This emphasis on handling still 
assumes an implicit distinction between material objects (which are assumed to have a 
body) and those transcendent, ‘immaterial’ processes that produce and/or give meaning to 
matter. As I will seek to demonstrate, it is this division, and the corresponding hierarchy 
of being it reflects, that Austerlitz critiques: the notion, for example, that I can touch this 
paper, but I cannot touch capitalism, or the Holocaust, or grief. The feminist philosopher 
Elizabeth Grosz writes that, in questioning the material/immaterial distinction, the aim is 
not to “reduce what there is to matter,” but to cultivate “an understanding of the real that 
[…] is capable of conceptualizing the nuances and layers of identity that matter carries 
within itself” (“Significant Differences” 1). Bryant makes a similar argument, writing: 
I certainly don’t, for example, wish to reduce symphonies, signifying 
systems, etc. to neurological events. [But] in drawing attention to the 
materiality of all those things we often think of as incorporeal—signifiers, 
signifying systems, discourses, cultural practices, etc.—a whole set of 
issues come into relief that we, in cultural studies, would not ordinarily 
notice. We come to recognize the temporal and spatial features of 
discourse, ideology, signifying systems, etc. (“Field of Discourse”) 
[emphasis in original] 
 
An object-oriented, vital materialist perspective does not reduce the subject to 
object status, nor does it disqualify the human perspective (as if there were only one 
mode of being human). Instead, it facilitates an expansion of attention that pluralizes 
angles of access onto the world while contextualizing our own. The subject is conceived 
of as an “object among many others”: radically other, wholly independent, yet entangled 
and enmeshed in a dynamic network of object-relations (Bryant, Democracy 22). 
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Addressing fears that adopting such a worldview would “authorize the treatment of 
people as mere things,” Bennett observes that:  
[The] Kantian imperative to treat humanity always as an end-in-itself and 
never merely as a means does not have a stellar record of success in 
preventing human suffering or promoting human well-being […] If matter 
itself is lively, then not only is the difference between subjects and objects 
minimized, but the status of the shared materiality of all things is elevated. 
All bodies become more than mere objects, as the thing-powers of 
resistance and protean agency are brought into sharper relief. Vital 
materialism would thus set up a kind of safety net for those humans who 
are now, in a world where Kantian morality is the standard, routinely 
made to suffer because they do not conform to a particular (Euro-
American, bourgeois, theocentric, or other) model of personhood. (12) 
 
Grosz similarly acknowledges that while this ontological framework does not 
“give us a politics (or an ethics) in itself,” it can “orient us toward political and ethical 
action” (“Significant Differences” 2). As much of the more explicitly political work in 
object-oriented theory has focused on environmental politics, Austerlitz offers a different 
context for thinking about what is ethically at stake in endorsing a vital materialist 
ontology.5 The text situates itself within a longer history of modernity, with many of its 
allusions dating back to the late medieval and early Renaissance periods. Its particular 
focus on twentieth century history, though, throws the question of the 
materiality/subjectivity relationship into sharp relief, as the Holocaust constitutes the 
modern era’s most chilling example of what can happen when we ground our political 
and moral judgments in a too-firm distinction between people and things. Rather than 
confirming the inherent uniqueness and worth of the individual human, such moral 
                                                
5 See, for example, Bennett’s reflections on food politics and waste disposal in Vibrant Matter, or Timothy 
Morton’s extensive discussions of the contemporary ecological crisis in The Ecological Thought (2012) 
and Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology After the End of the World (2013).  
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systems often open up the possibility of redrawing the lines between human/nonhuman, 
in order to relegate certain groups of people to object status. Grosz writes that the 
human/nonhuman division operates by the same logic as other, familiar binaries—
between mind and matter, subject and object, culture and nature, and so on (Volatile 
Bodies 3). In each of these pairings, the former term defines itself through the (often 
violent) expulsion of the latter: for instance, body or matter is defined negatively as 
“what is not mind, what is distinct from and other than the privileged term,” understood 
in “nonhistorical, naturalistic, organicist, passive, inert terms” (Volatile Bodies 3).  
If matter is already vital, as these theorists suggest, then the task is not to bestow 
vitality upon objects but to develop ways of tuning our attention differently, so as to 
better perceive various bodies (human, textual, and otherwise) as entangled, enmeshed, 
and mutually constituting. Within object-oriented philosophy, the concept of the 
‘encounter’ is often used to describe how entities can affect or influence each other while 
still remaining “withdrawn,” or irreducible to the perspective of any single observer.6 
According to the object-oriented literary theorist Timothy Morton, the encounter must be 
figured as an experience, not just an event occurring at some fixed point in space and 
time (The Ecological Thought 78). An encounter produces something new—a weird, 
shifting assemblage of things, subjects, experiences, and affects—but it also names a kind 
of paradigm shift, a change in our angle of vision. The encounter does not stage a 
confrontation between a preexisting human subject and a discrete, self-contained object. 
                                                
6 The notion that objects “withdraw” from complete access is an important tenet of object-oriented thought, 
but not strictly relevant to my argument here. Cf. Bryant, The Democracy of Objects for a longer 
discussion of this issue. 
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Rather, it brings us into an intimate awareness of our entanglement in a dynamic network 
of relations: “When I encounter the strange stranger, I gaze into depths of space far most 
vast and profound than physical space that can be measured with instruments […] 





















Spatial Memory and the Rail Station 
 In Austerlitz, experiences like the one Morton describes occur most frequently in 
rail stations—a reminder, perhaps, that the figure of the encounter cannot be easily 
disentangled from long histories of trauma, erasure, and displacement. In his cultural 
geography of the German railway system, Todd Presner describes the nineteenth-century 
rail station as the “best material witness to German/Jewish modernity […] an embodied, 
transnational space emblematic of both the emancipatory hopes and the destructive 
nightmares of an epoch” (2).7 For Presner, as for Sebald, railways embody the “dialectic 
of modernity,” one face of which is “construction, progress, and emancipation,” and the 
other “destruction, regression, and enslavement” (Presner 10). The ‘objectifying’ effect 
of rail transit was also a principal anxiety for nineteenth century writers, who worried that 
“the industrial nature of railway travel effectively turned passengers into parcels” (Long 
145). In Austerlitz, train stations have special resonance as sites of convergence but also 
of dissolution, marked “by both blissful happiness and profound misfortune” (34). Most 
critics have emphasized the associations with “profound misfortune”—not surprising, 
given the tendency to frame the novel as a work of Holocaust literature and thus to 
associate rail transit with mass deportations. In an essay on narrative temporality in 
Austerlitz, Amir Eshel argues that the train station serves as “the crypt of the modern age” 
                                                
7 Drawing on Walter Benjamin’s analysis of rail transit in The Arcades Project, Presner situates the rail 
station within a longer history of modernity, focusing on (pre-Holocaust) depictions of rail transit in 
nineteenth-century German and Jewish literature. Presner’s description of his project—a “cultural 
geography” that examines “the spatial constitution of a German/Jewish modernity by mapping its 
intellectual and cultural history onto a decidedly cultural-geographic surface: the railway system”—also 
resonates with Sebald’s extended meditations on the relationship between rail transit and spatial 
memory in Austerlitz (Presner 12).  
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(Eshel 85). Focusing on one of Austerlitz’s long digressions on the construction of the 
Liverpool Street Station in London, Eshel writes:  
[Humans] are removed from their ‘natural’ place, and nature itself is 
crushed by the nonhuman, indeed inhuman, body of modernity—a body 
whose threatening muscle […] is that of railway transportation. What is 
left of ‘nature’ is only railway tracks, spaces of transition on which trains 
carrying their material and human loads are rushing back and forth. 
‘Time,’ standardized time, and railway transportation are two elements of 
the nexus of modernity and barbarism. They participate in and perpetuate 
the cycle of ruthless, narrow rationalism (85). 
Eshel’s reading complicates the conventional nature/culture divide, tracing out a 
more complex relationship between nature, technology, and humankind. Modernity’s 
technological developments—including the rail system—are the products of human 
activity, yet they are aligned here with the nonhuman (“indeed inhuman”) realm, figured 
in antagonistic opposition to both humanity and a rapidly vanishing natural world. In 
treating the rail system as both symptom and cause of a “ruthless, narrow rationalism,” 
Eshel’s reading resonates with Austerlitz’s own remark, made during his first 
conversation with the narrator, that “time truly [reigned] supreme” in Europe only after 
the standardization of the railway tables in the mid-nineteenth century (Austerlitz 12). 
This regimenting of time, Austerlitz says, also produced a static conception of space: “It 
was only by following the course time prescribed that we could hasten through the 
gigantic spaces separating us from each other” (12).  
Situating Austerlitz’s experiences within this context, then, allows us to consider 
how the encounter radically reconfigures the subject-object relationship without positing 
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it as a utopian or apolitical experience, unconstrained by the limits of bodies, identities, 
and relations of power. While the novel draws a strong connection between train stations 
and a rigidly linear temporality, Austerlitz’s fascination with train stations cannot be read 
in purely negative terms. In the conversation cited above, he notes that the experience of 
traveling by train seems to reveal the “illusionistic and illusory” nature of constructs like 
linear time and fixed space (12). Rail stations are liminal spaces, subsumed into patterns 
of movement that are shaped in turn by the temporal rhythms of industrial capitalism. But 
stations, like objects, are also disturbingly solid: sites of densely knotted history, feeling, 
and experience, which are permeable in some ways and yet never dissolve entirely into 
the currents of time or capital in which they are immersed.  
Early in the novel, Austerlitz tells the narrator that he often finds himself caught 
up “in the grip of dangerous and entirely incomprehensible currents of emotion” when he 
enters the Parisian train stations (34). While the narrator interprets this comment as a rare 
glimpse into the inner workings of his friend’s mind, Austerlitz’s remark seems 
destabilize any easy distinction between interior and exterior. In fact, the experience he 
describes gestures towards a different understanding of the subject, one which bears a 
strong resemblance to the railway system itself—a subject imagined not as a wholly self-
contained agent, divided between private thought and public action, but as a radically 
open system, crisscrossed by forces that exceed the individual’s complete comprehension 
or control. As Austerlitz’s own experiences in train stations demonstrate, such spaces 
often activate memory in unpredictable ways, including forms of collective or affective 
memory that cannot be said to ‘belong’ to any specific individual. While these 
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experiences are “dangerous” in that they threaten the self’s coherency, they also offer a 
model of memory that is exterior and place-bound rather than grounded in the interiority 
of the individual. As such, they facilitate forms of contact with the past that Austerlitz 
finds impossible to attain elsewhere (for example, on his research trips to various 
institutional archives like the Bibliothèque Nationale in Paris or the Imperial War 
Museum in London).  
One of the most pivotal encounters in the novel—and the first ‘contact’ Austerlitz 
has with his own early history—takes place at London’s Liverpool Street Station. 
Austerlitz, who has been suffering from a series of mysterious and increasingly 
debilitating anxiety attacks, finds himself repeatedly drawn to the Liverpool station, a 
place he describes as “one of the darkest and most sinister places in London” (128). Built 
below street level, the old rail station exists in a state of “eternal dusk,” its clouded glass 
ceiling admitting only a faint and diffuse grey light (128). The walls and columns are 
thickly coated by a “greasy black layer formed, over the course of a century, by coke dust 
and soot, steam, sulfur, and diesel oil” (128). For Austerlitz, the grease on the walls also 
recalls the psychic residuum of suffering that he imagines to have accumulated at this 
site, which housed the notorious Bedlam asylum before the station was built. “I often 
wondered whether the pain and suffering accumulated on this site over the centuries had 
ever really ebbed away,” Austerlitz says, “or whether they might not still, as I sometimes 
thought […] be sensed as we passed through them” (130).  
For months, Austerlitz returns to the site daily to watch the crowds of 
“innumerable people [passing] in great tides” through the station (128). These faceless 
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crowds never break apart into individual travelers; instead, they are described as a kind of 
natural or elemental force akin to a river, “coming together, moving apart, and being held 
up at barriers and bottlenecks like water against a weir” (128). Though he stands 
physically in their midst, Austerlitz remains at a remove from them. He is not traveling; 
nor is he, as an academic, bound to the same regimented schedule as the laborers and 
businesspeople moving through the station on their way to and from work. While 
Austerlitz can recount the details of the station’s history with ease, he is similarly unable 
to locate himself within it. For Austerlitz, this inability to situate himself in relation to a 
larger collective or a longer history springs from his failure establish any kind of 
intellectual or emotional connection between his present and the past. This disconnect 
creates in him an abiding fear, reiterated throughout the novel, that he himself is not real: 
“As far back as I can remember […] I have always felt as if I had no place in reality, as if 
I were not there at all” (185).  
One day, by chance, Austerlitz crosses over the builders’ fence that separates the 
active lines from the disused section of the station. Upon stepping into a large, vacant hall 
formerly used as a ladies’ waiting room (“the existence of which, in this remote part of 
the station, had been quite unknown to me”), he has a remarkable experience:  
Minutes or even hours may have passed while I stood in that empty space 
beneath a ceiling which seemed to float at a vertiginous height, unable to 
move from the spot, with my face raised to the icy gray light, like 
moonshine, which came through the windows in a gallery beneath the 
vaulted roof, and hung above me like a tight-meshed net or a piece of thin, 
fraying fabric […] From time to time, and just for a split second, I saw 
huge halls open up, with rows of pillars and colonnades leading far into 
the distance […] I saw viaducts and footbridges crossing deep chasms 
thronged with tiny figures who looked to me, said Austerlitz, like 
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prisoners in search of some way of escape from their dungeon, and the 
longer I stared upwards with my head wrenched painfully back, the more I 
felt as if the room where I stood were expanding, going on for ever and 
ever in an improbably foreshortened perspective, at the same time turning 
back into itself in a way possible only in such a deranged universe (135). 
 
Apart from his entry into the room, neither Austerlitz nor the space itself have 
undergone any discernible physical change. In fact, Austerlitz is rooted to the spot, his 
face upturned to the ceiling. Yet without moving, he experiences a sudden shift—a 
change in his angle of vision that, for Morton, both heralds and constitutes the encounter. 
Austerlitz is not depicted here as a self-contained subject who decides to look, nor is 
there anything passive about this encounter with the more-than-human world. Instead, a 
way of looking takes hold of him, seizing him in a way that is painful and even violent 
(his head is “wrenched back”). Reality does not make itself available to Austerlitz as a 
specimen to be described, studied, or known. It throws him, making it impossible to 
establish where the ‘material’ realm ends and the ‘immaterial’ begins.  
In this passage, light—more conventionally depicted as atmospheric or 
immaterial—assumes corporeal form, appearing in Austerlitz’s view like a net or a 
ragged piece of cloth stretched across the hall. Brightest at the ceiling, fading as it sinks 
lower, the light seems to be “running down in black streaks, rather like rainwater running 
down the smooth trunks of beech trees or over the cast concrete façade of a building” 
(135). (This description, which implicitly links the Liverpool station episode to the 
novel’s more overtly natural historical sections, exemplifies what I will later call Sebald’s 
‘natural historical’ gaze—a way of looking that registers continuity rather than 
disconnect between the human and nonhuman worlds.) Light is often associated with 
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illumination or increased clarity of vision, its presence and quality either facilitating or 
impeding the observer’s ability to perceive an external reality. Embodied in this way, 
however, the “icy gray light” becomes an object in its own right, capable of encountering 
other objects—including Austerlitz himself. Rather than confirming the contours of an 
objective and knowable world, this experience awakens in Austerlitz a sense of a much 
stranger, less fixed reality.  
Near the end of this episode, Austerlitz becomes aware that he is not alone in the 
room. Across the hall, a middle-aged couple is meeting a child who has just arrived on 
the train. As Austerlitz watches them, he sees that the young boy is carrying a rucksack 
identical to his own. “But for that rucksack I don’t think I would have known him,” 
Austerlitz says—for, as he realizes suddenly, the boy is the four-year-old Jacques 
Austerlitz, arriving at the Liverpool Street Station to meet his Welsh foster parents more 
than fifty years earlier (137). Significantly, this moment of recognition—the first contact 
he has been able to establish with his past—is not framed as a recuperation. Austerlitz’s 
vision of the arrival scene is depicted as doubly external, in that it occurs spatially outside 
of himself (he stands at one end of the hall and the boy at the other), and also remains 
irreducible to his own first-person perspective. Austerlitz recognizes himself, but his past 
does not return to him as lived experience or sense-memory, assimilated back into the 
“I.” Initially, this experience only reinforces his feelings of estrangement, causing him to 
experience a “sense of shame and sorrow” and a “terrible weariness […] at the idea that I 
had never really been alive, or was only now being born, almost on the eve of my death” 
(137). In a larger sense, however, this episode marks a turning point, both in the plot (the 
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encounter galvanizes Austerlitz into seeking out his past) and in terms of how Austerlitz 
conceives of his relationship to space and time. In place of a fixed, linear history, 
Austerlitz begins to develop the sense that: 
time did not exist at all, only various spaces interlocking according to the 
rules of a higher form of stereometry, between which the living and the 
dead can move back and forth as they like, and the longer I think about it 
the more it seems to me that we who are still alive are unreal in the eyes of 
the dead, that only occasionally, in certain lights and atmospheric 
conditions, do we appear in their field of vision (185). 
 
 Imagining time as a set of interlocking spaces might seem to produce an even 
flatter, more grid-like vision of reality than a strictly linear temporality. But this 
conception also permits Austerlitz to imagine other ways of moving through time, 
offering an alternative to the understanding of history as an inexorable forward march. In 
describing the rules that govern these interlocking spaces, Austerlitz invokes a now-
defunct branch of physics and natural geometry practiced in the late sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries: stereometry, or “the art or science of measuring solids; that branch 
of geometry which deals with solid figures, solid geometry; the practical application of 
this to the measurement of solid bodies” (OED). A “higher form of stereometry” would 
expand the category of “solid bodies” to encompass not just physical things, but also 
those supposedly incorporeal elements or processes like light, feeling, and history—
entities envisioned here not as bodiless or transcendent, but as enmeshed in material 
reality, possessed of a specific and tangible weight.8 
                                                
8 In an interview shortly after the publication of his novel The Emigrants (1992), Sebald reflected: “The 
older you get, in a sense, the more you forget […] But that which survives in your mind acquires a very 
considerable degree of density, a very high degree of specific weight” (Emergence 54). 
19 
Walter Benjamin and Object-Oriented Theory: An Encounter 
Though Austerlitz never directly references Walter Benjamin, the German critic 
looms large in the novel’s imagination, both as a philosopher of history and as a model of 
critical practice. Austerlitz himself is a quasi-Benjaminian figure; his unfinished, ever-
expanding dissertation project on the “architectural style of the capitalist era,” for 
example, is an obvious allusion to Benjamin’s unfinished Arcades Project, his massive 
but fragmentary study of the nineteenth-century Parisian arcades (Austerlitz 33). Like the 
object-oriented theorists, Benjamin argues that static conceptions of time and history 
emerge out of, and are continually reinforced by, a static conception of matter. In his 
1940 essay “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” he outlines a detailed critique of what 
he calls ‘historicism,’ a philosophy of history that views the past as linear, successive, 
and fixed. Benjamin writes that historicism “rightly culminates in universal history, [for] 
its method is additive; it musters a mass of data to fill the homogenous, empty time” 
(“Theses” 262). The historicist critic gives the past the form of an “‘eternal’ image,” 
stringing it into a sequence of events that can be told repeatedly and without variation, 
“like the beads of a rosary” (“Theses” 263). In “Paris, Capital of the Nineteenth 
Century,” Benjamin articulates an even clearer link between historicism and a 
conventional understanding of the object as inert, passive matter. The historicist, 
Benjamin writes, views the past as “an endless series of facts congealed in the form of 
things,” to be amassed and inventoried in “the aererium of civilization” (Arcades Project 
14).  
Though Benjamin’s critique of historicism is realized most fully in his later 
20 
essays, the relationship between linear history and ‘non-vital’ materiality emerges first in 
a much earlier work: his graduate dissertation on seventeenth-century baroque drama. In 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama (1928), Benjamin warns that a flat conception of 
matter produces a similarly ‘flat’ version of history, which he calls “natural history.” Like 
many of Benjamin’s central concepts, “natural history” invokes an older Western 
intellectual tradition, but takes on a specific and highly idiosyncratic meaning within the 
context of his work. In Benjamin’s analysis, the baroque dramatist views material things, 
structures, and landscapes as a raw, formless substance upon which human history is 
stamped or “impressed” (OGT). As in a historicist framework, the nonhuman world is 
made to serve as either prop or setting in the enactment of an exclusively human drama. 
While the historicist draws from this relationship a sense of heightened agency, grounded 
in the belief that the “things” of the past can be acquired and hoarded up by those in 
power, the baroque dramatist perceives this relationship in terms of diminished agency 
(and, by extension, responsibility). For the baroque dramatist, Benjamin writes, history 
becomes “chronicle” (OGT 90). Human catastrophe thus “merges into setting,” accorded 
no greater ethical valence than a natural disaster (OGT 92). Both the historicist and the 
baroque natural historical framework prevent us from seeing the relationship between 
past and present as a site of dynamic and ongoing negotiation, whose very contestation 
signals the potential for becoming-otherwise.  
Benjamin’s ideal critic is the historical materialist, who sees “the work of the past 
as still uncompleted” (“Edward Fuchs” 35). Historical materialism, he writes, “perceives 
of no epoch in which the completed past could even in part drop conveniently, thing-like, 
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into mankind’s lap”; it seeks to supply instead “a unique experience with the past” 
(“Eduard Fuchs” 35-6; “Theses” 262). This description of the historical materialist’s 
experiential relationship to history recalls the language of the encounter: an experience 
that, for Austerlitz, opens up new ways of situating himself in relation to the past, and of 
accounting for the persistent “claim” that this past still exercises over the present 
(Benjamin, “Theses” 254). Though object-oriented theory’s central concerns often 
overlap with Benjamin’s, no sustained effort has yet been made to bring these two bodies 
of work into conversation.9 In my next reading, I seek to draw out some of these 
connections, treating Austerlitz as an encounter of sorts between object-oriented theory 
and Benjamin’s philosophy of history. 
Upon arriving in Terezin, the site where his mother was interned, Austerlitz finds 
the town oddly deserted. As he wanders along the streets and alleyways, making notes 
and taking photographs, he is confronted by a series of locked doors and shuttered 
windows. These doors physically bar him from entering the buildings, and, in most 
critical readings of the text, symbolize the impossibility of accessing the past he has come 
in search of. Though he may describe and document the physical exteriors of the 
buildings (the whitewashed walls, the spiders “spinning their threads, scuttling on 
crooked legs”) he cannot gain access to the secret heart of experience itself (190). The 
issue of blocked access is enacted even at the level of the sentences themselves: 
Austerlitz recalls, for example, how he “thought [he] sensed” that the doors of Terezin 
                                                
9 This may be because of Benjamin’s interest in the figure of the “collector”—a term which, in the context 
of object-oriented ontology, may seem to imply that the human is still privileged as the subject who 
gives meaning or significance to lifeless objects. I return to this point in the final section of my paper. 
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“[obstructed] access to a darkness never yet penetrated” (190). Thinking is subtly 
dissociated here from sensing, opening up a gap that can only be bridged by an imprecise 
translation of feeling into thought. In his reading of the Terezin episode, J.J. Long writes 
that Austerlitz is shut out from the past, estranged not just from the knowledge of his 
mother’s fate but also from the possibility of experiencing the world as she and the other 
Jewish internees did: “The knowledge Austerlitz desires precludes internalization, or, to 
put it another way, Austerlitz will always be shut out from the knowledge he seeks” 
(Long 160). Austerlitz seems condemned to always arrive too late and understand too 
little about his own history—condemned, in other words, to have “no place in reality” (A 
185).  
An object-oriented reading of this episode, by contrast, opens up different ways of 
reading the ‘barrier’ between past and present. In the novel, Austerlitz’s description of 
the closed doors transitions almost immediately into another recounting, this time of a 
dream he has some time after leaving Terezin. In this dream, Austerlitz has managed to 
gain access to the Terezin barracks at last. Instead of finding his mother or the other 
internees within, he discovers that the barracks have been “filled from floor to ceiling 
with layer upon layer of the cobwebs woven by those ingenious creatures,” the spiders 
(190). Upon waking, he recalls how he: 
tried to hold fast to my powdery gray dream image, which sometimes 
quivered in a slight breath of air, and to discover what it concealed, but it 
only dissolved all the more and was overlaid by the memory, surfacing in 
my mind at the same time, of the shining glass on the display windows of 
the ANTIKOS BAZAR […] where I had stood for a long time around 
midday in what proved to be the vain hope that someone might arrive and 
open this curious emporium. (194)  
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Like the spiderwebs in the Terezin barracks, which testify to decades of activity in 
the absence of human actors, the objects in the bazaar have a nonhuman vitality that 
compels Austerlitz’s attention. The display case is crammed full of things: “hundreds of 
different objects” are visible in the window alone, which Austerlitz knows must represent 
“only a small part of the junk heaped up inside the shop” (195). In contrast with the 
empty streets and houses of Terezin, which are laid out “to a strict geometrical grid,” the 
objects in the window seem haphazardly arranged, lacking a discernible ordering 
principle (195). Indeed, the longer Austerlitz stands looking at the display, the more it 
seems that the objects have not been arranged at all, at least not by a human hand. His 
initial assumption—that these “still lifes [were] obviously composed entirely at 
random”—gives way to a sense that the objects have in fact “grown quite naturally into 
the black branches of the lime trees standing around the square and reflected in the glass 
of the windows” (195). As the juxtaposition of natural imagery and human-made objects 
indicates, there is a different kind of natural historical gaze at work in this passage. This 
mode of perception does not, as Benjamin fears, reduce human history to natural disaster, 
but does suggest an intertwinement or a ‘growing together’ of these two seemingly 
divergent temporal and material frameworks. As Austerlitz later speculates, it is likely 
that many of the objects in the case once belonged to the Jewish inhabitants of the camp, 
but had “outlived their former owners and survived the process of destruction” (197). 
Like the rail station, the objects in the display case are linked not only to the temporal 
rhythms of the natural world, but also to longer histories of displacement and modern 
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habits of production and consumption. 
Entranced by the display, Austerlitz draws physically closer until he is standing 
with “[his] forehead pressed against the cold window,” staring at the array of objects 
before him (195). He describes the objects in the window with his typically fine-grained 
attention to detail, focusing especially on the array of materials (the “light, pale, summery 
linen” of an embroidered jacket, the “worn brocade cover” of an armchair) and each 
object’s style of composition (the “fine brushstrokes” of a painted lampshade, the “moth-
eaten” stuffed squirrel) (196). Gazing at a porcelain figurine of a rider pulling a girl onto 
a horse, Austerlitz thinks that the things exhibited in the shop window: 
were all as timeless as that moment of rescue, perpetuated but forever just 
occurring, these ornaments, utensils, and mementoes stranded in the 
Terezin bazaar, objects that for reasons one could never know had outlived 
their former owners and survived the process of destruction, so that I 
could now see my own faint shadow image barely perceptible among them 
(197). 
 
 In the act of describing these objects, Austerlitz becomes the object of his own 
attention: as available to description, yet still as vital and strange, as the items displayed 
in the window. As he apprehends himself in the present moment for the first time, he is 
integrated into his own textual and visual description (his shadow is present, if “barely 
perceptible,” in the image of the display window reproduced in the text).  Unlike the 
forms of documentation Austerlitz practices at the beginning of the novel, which seem to 
exclude him from his environment, this practice of description figures the seeing self as 
enmeshed in a network of relations with the objects he describes, grown “quite naturally” 
in their midst.  
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The display window separates Austerlitz from the things inside, and in that 
respect is, like the locked doors, a barrier to some real or imagined interior. But the glass 
is also a space in which natural, human, and artificially constructed objects seem to exist 
on the same footing—in which everything (the mementoes, the lime trees, reflection and 
shadow, human and nonhuman) is equally foregrounded. In that sense, the case is 
analogous to the text itself, which displays textual and visual ‘objects’ including 
historical anecdotes, memories, and visual artifacts like photographs. Austerlitz’s long, 
meticulous descriptions are also, like the glass of the display window, a two-dimensional 
surface where physical things and structures exist on the same level of ‘reality’ as 
thought, feeling, and historical processes. Within the space of Austerlitz’s description 
above, for example, the seemingly impassable doors of Terezin dissolve into the dream of 
the finely woven cobwebs (delicate, yet strangely dense), which in turn give way as the 
display window “surfaces” in the text. Such passages make it increasingly difficult to 
parse the material from the immaterial, or to make a clear distinction between experience, 
thought, and fantasy. Like the light in the Liverpool station episode, literary 
representation emerges both as an object in its own right and as a contact zone—the 
staging ground for a series of shifting encounters between past and present, reader and 
text, observer and environment.  
In a recent essay entitled “Context Stinks!”, the literary critic Rita Felski decries a 
tendency among contemporary critics to “[treat] works of art only as cultural symptoms 
of their own moment, as moribund matter buried in the past” (575). Reflecting on the 
differences between a ‘historicist’ literary critical practice and an object-oriented one, 
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Felski concludes that the former approach limits our ability to imagine other forms of 
engagement with the “textual object”:  
Instead of swarms of actors moving toward each other, we imagine an 
immobile textual object enclosed within an all-determining contextual 
frame. Frozen in time and space, the literary work is deprived of the very 
mobility that forms the precondition of our own experience of it. Impaled 
on the pin of our historical categories and coordinates, it exists only as an 
object-to-be-explained rather than a fellow actor and cocreator of 
relations, attitudes, and attachments (590). 
 
 Though Felski does not directly cite Benjamin here, her call to develop a mode of 
criticism that would treat the text as a “fellow actor and cocreator” of history suggests an 
important link between his critique and object-oriented theory. Her notion of the text as a 
specimen “impaled on [a] pin” also deliberately invokes the image of a sterile museum 
display, while the reference to “historical categories and coordinates” alludes to the forms 
of taxonomic analysis that dominated natural history in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. As the historian Brian Ogilvie notes in his book The Science of Describing, this 
growing emphasis on taxonomy corresponded with the professionalization of natural 
history and the rise of the institutional natural history museum. Nineteenth century 
taxonomists practiced modes of collection and display that uprooted living specimens 
from their environments and pinned them into place so as to view and describe them from 
a panoptical perspective (Ogilvie). These methodologies, Ogilvie writes, supplanted an 
earlier Renaissance naturalist tradition that privileged collaborative scholarship and in 
situ engagement with the natural world (Ogilvie). Sebald makes frequent reference to 
figures from this older tradition in his literary work (most notably the seventeenth century 
polymath and naturalist Thomas Browne, who is a major figure in Sebald’s 1995 novel 
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The Rings of Saturn).10 As David Freedberg writes, the texts produced by Renaissance 
natural historians often mixed multiple sources and mediums, including poetry, 
anthropology, personal anecdote, and carefully hand-colored illustrations—a description 
reminiscent of Sebald’s own mixed-genre texts (Freedberg 162).   
 In engaging with this older natural historical tradition, Sebald must also reckon 
with the dramatically altered political circumstances of his own era. In On the Natural 
History of Destruction (1999), a series of lectures on postwar literature, Sebald considers 
how such a history might be written. Reflecting on the Allied bombing campaign on 
major German cities, an event that permanently altered the country’s physical and 
psychic landscape, Sebald writes: 
How ought such a natural history of destruction begin? With a summary of 
the technical, organizational, and political prerequisites for carrying out 
large-scale air raids? With a scientific account of the previously unknown 
phenomenon of the firestorms? With a pathological record of typical 
modes of death, or with the behavioral studies of the instincts of flight and 
homecoming? (OND 47) 
 
 Though these lectures are not my focus here, they are of interest in thinking about 
how Sebald understands the problem of representing human and ecological trauma on an 
unprecedented scale. Modernity’s capacity for engineering destruction demands new 
forms of natural history—forms capable of registering how these “processes of 
destruction” increasingly cross and confound the division between the human and 
nonhuman worlds (A 197). Sebald’s remarks suggest that such a history must incorporate 
macroscopic or ‘objective’ forms of analysis rather than remaining tethered to the 
                                                
10 Cf. Mark McCulloh’s Understanding W.G. Sebald for a further discussion of the Sebald/Browne 
connection. McCulloh describes Browne as “a kindred soul to Sebald” and the “spiritual patron” of The 
Rings of Saturn (61). 
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individual perspective, a move that anticipates Austerlitz’s desire to map those “marks of 
pain [that] trace countless fine lines through history” (16). Posing these suggestions in the 
form of questions, though, leaves the issue unresolved, perhaps reflecting a reluctance to 
endorse the sort of historical “chronicle” that would fix events and actors in place like 
specimens “impaled on [a] pin” (Felski 595). As I will suggest in the final part of my 
paper, Austerlitz is guided by these concerns, but seeks also to reframe the debate—
offering an alternative to the choice between intimacy and detachment, between a history 
told in the first person and a history that remains at a safe distance from its objects. 
Austerlitz extends Benjamin’s critique but also expands the ontological playing field, 
transforming the “work of the past” into a collaborative project that engages human and 












An Ethics of (Nonhuman) Witness 
As Austerlitz travels to different sites associated with his family’s past (including 
his childhood home in Prague, the Terezin ghetto where his mother was interned, and 
various state archives), he repeatedly experiences a bizarre form of déjà vu: the feeling 
not that he has seen these sites or objects before, but that they have already seen him. 
Looking at a series of snapshots from his childhood, Austerlitz muses on “the mysterious 
quality peculiar to such photographs when they surface from oblivion,” a quality that 
gives one the impression “of something stirring in them […] as if they had a memory of 
their own and remembered us” (182). He experiences this phenomenon again while 
traveling via train from Prague to Germany for the first time since the Kindertransport. 
Disembarking at one of the stations along the way, Austerlitz: 
went out to the platform to photograph the capital of a cast-iron column 
which had touched some chord of recognition in me. What made me 
uneasy at the sight of it, however, was not the question whether the 
complex form of the capital, now covered with a puce-tinged encrustation, 
had really impressed itself on my mind when I passed through Pilsen with 
the children’s transport in the summer of 1939, but the idea, ridiculous in 
itself, that this cast-iron column, which, with its scaly surface seemed 
almost to approach the nature of a living being, might remember me and 
was, if I may so put it, said Austerlitz, a witness to what I could no longer 
recollect for myself (221). 
 
For Austerlitz, the cast-iron column occupies an uncertain position between the 
categories of past/present, organic/inorganic, and matter/mind. In wondering whether the 
column “had really impressed itself on my mind,” Austerlitz implicitly places his mind 
and the material object on the same ontological footing. Memory is depicted here not as a 
meta-representational system, through which an external stimulus is given form and 
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meaning, but as a flat surface brought into contact with another flat surface (the “scaly 
surface” of the cast-iron column, to be exact) (221). Like the photographs or the train 
station, the cast-iron column does not serve simply as a repository for human histories, 
nor is it depicted as a medium through which Austerlitz is able to access his lost 
memories. While Austerlitz acknowledges that human memory can, and often does, 
function in this way, with places, situations, or things summoning up experiences long 
submerged or forgotten, what emerges here is a different conception of the object’s 
relationship to history. What makes Austerlitz “uneasy” about the column is not his 
failure to remember whether or not he has seen it before, but rather the realization that his 
own memory or thought need not enter into the equation at all—that the cast-iron column 
may well possess its own independent capacity for bearing witness to history.  
Though Austerlitz describes the idea as “ridiculous in itself,” the novel frequently 
situates human consciousness on a continuum with animals, structures, and things. 
“There is no reason to suppose that lesser beings are devoid of sentient life,” Austerlitz 
says at one point, speculating that “perhaps moths dream as well, perhaps a lettuce in the 
garden dreams as it looks up at the moon at night” (94). Certainly there is some degree of 
anthropomorphizing occurring in these examples, but as Morton and Bennett note, the 
anthropomorphic element in human perception need not be fatal to a vital materialist 
project. In fact, Bennett argues that it may even be productive: 
We at first may see only a world in our own image, but what appears next is a 
swarm of ‘talented’ and vibrant materialities (including the seeing self). A touch 
of anthropomorphism, then, can catalyze a sensibility that finds a world filled not 
with ontologically distinct categories of being (subjects and objects) but with 
variously composed materialities that form confederations” (99).  
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Bennett’s comment about recognizing the “seeing self” as part of the “swarm of 
‘talented’ and vibrant materialities” recalls the display window scene, but also implicitly 
gestures towards Sebald’s specific natural historical “sensibility” (99). In these 
encounters, it is not that Austerlitz, the human subject, has graciously extended the 
capacity for acting, moving, or witnessing to a nonhuman entity within the circumscribed 
space of the encounter. Instead, Austerlitz’s encounter with the cast-iron column, like his 
experience in the Liverpool Street Station, seems to heighten his own sensory-perceptual 
capabilities, allowing him to perceive things as having independent bodies, powers, and 
ways of affecting other entities.  
Austerlitz frames this form of contact as a tactile experience that brings bodies 
into contact—or, as the word “chord” suggests, into resonance. Like the “stirring” 
photographs, touch has dual connotations of action and reaction: it is, by definition, 
always an encounter, never purely a doing or a receiving. Touch also, of course, suggests 
emotional response—implying that the ‘flattening’ of memory into matter, or the 
separation of witnessing from empathizing, does not forestall affective engagement. In 
fact, this conception of ‘flat engagement’ or surface contact gives rise to a much weirder 
and more densely layered vision of reality: a reality in which a cast-iron column is not 
seen as a block of dead, inert stone, but as a scaly, shifting, animate being. Similarly, 
treating memory as a kind of material object (on par with, and enmeshed in, other 
physical objects) does not evacuate agency. Instead, what emerges is a kind of intensified 
or extended agency, a concept of agency stretched far beyond its conventional limits. As 
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Bennett writes, the capacity of these ‘bodies’ is “not restricted to a passive 
‘intractability,’ but [includes] the ability to make things happen, to produce effects” 
(Bennett 5).  
 The emphasis Austerlitz places on nonhuman witnessing also suggests an 
important connection between the novel’s descriptive practices and its larger ethical and 
political project. Asked in an interview why Austerlitz never ventures beyond the 
threshold of the concentration camps, Sebald replied: “To write about the concentration 
camps is in my view practically impossible. […] These images militate against our 
capacity for discursive thinking, for reflecting upon these things. And also paralyze, as it 
were, our moral capacity” (Emergence of Memory 140). For Sebald, any encounter 
between a reader and an “image” of suffering always involves the possibility (indeed, the 
inevitability) of failure, whether it is the writer’s failure to convey the magnitude of the 
event or the reader’s failure to adequately grasp, reflect upon, and respond to the situation 
depicted. The cast-iron column and the Liverpool station episodes both sketch out a form 
of memory that is emphatically not grounded in recall, recovery, or even imaginative 
reconstruction. Austerlitz does not try to reconstruct what the column has ‘seen,’ nor does 
he imagine what it might feel like to be a cast-iron column himself. The bodily frames of 
these two entities (the human and the column) are simply too different, their sensory 
apparatuses too unlike, to trigger this kind of empathetic response. Though Austerlitz 
wonders if the column has been “a witness to what [he] could no longer recollect for 
[himself],” what emerges here is a model of historical witness detached from the activity 
of projective identification and untethered from the human subject.   
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 In her recent work on literary ethics and description, Heather Love outlines and 
critiques what she calls the “empathetic witness” position, a model of critical engagement 
grounded in the “affective and ethical capacities of the witness” (“Safe” 7). She calls for 
the humanities to adopt modes of reading that would refuse the “ethical charisma of the 
literary translator or messenger,” citing the observation-based social sciences as an 
example of a field that does not engage the “metaphysical and humanist concerns of 
hermeneutics” (“Close but Not Deep” 375). Fields like ethology and microsociology, 
Love writes, have developed “practices of close attention” that produce detailed and 
precise descriptions of human and animal behavior (“Close” 375). In focusing on 
“descriptions of surfaces, operations, and interactions,” these disciplines bypass the issue 
of accounting for the interiority of the other—a humanist project that, she argues, 
“always involves a certain violence, whether it is by the hard way of epistemological 
violence or the soft way of projective identification” (“Safe” 7).  
 Flat reading or “thin description,” as Love refers to it elsewhere, offers the 
possibility of formulating “an alternative ethics, one grounded in documentation and 
description rather than empathy and witness” (“Close” 376). Within a critical framework 
that privileges testimony-based witness, Austerlitz’s descriptions might strike some 
readers as superficial, even evasive, skimming over the surfaces of things but rarely 
achieving the depth or degree of emotional intensity we look for in literature concerned 
with traumatic experience. But framing our reading of Austerlitz in terms of first-person 
witness—asking, in essence, why Austerlitz does not or cannot bear such witness to the 
Holocaust—obscures how the novel reconfigures the activity of witnessing itself, not to 
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mention the category of ‘persons.’ This approach also encourages us to read through the 
text, treating its descriptions as a thin veneer overlaying what Cathy Caruth calls the 
“inexplicable traumatic void” (Caruth, Trauma and Experience, 7). By contrast, reading 
these passages as part of an alternative practice of observation and documentation allows 
us to consider the text’s descriptive impulse in a new light, as a way of keeping us “close 
but not deep,” in Love’s phrase: dwelling within a vitally material reality, rather than 
located somewhere outside or above it.  
In Austerlitz, this vision of reality is not always affirming or uplifting. Cultivating 
a vital materialism may involve celebrating the rich diversity of human and nonhuman 
forms, but it also entails acknowledging a more unpredictable, unknowable, and 
potentially dangerous field of being. Similarly, an object-oriented reading may well force 
us to reckon in new and potentially painful ways with the limitations of our cultural and 
bodily frames. In the process, however, such experiences can also facilitate different 
ways of inhabiting those positions, and of locating ourselves in relation to the worlds and 
histories we have “grown quite naturally” into. Time and space need not be conceived of 
as static fields through which passive bodies are shuttled from an irrevocable past into an 
inalterable future; instead, the past, like the text or the ‘object’ more broadly, becomes a 
space of encounter, a contact zone, a hinge. 
Here we might return to the passage I quoted at the beginning of this essay, in 
which Austerlitz reflects on his fascination with “the shape and the self-contained nature 
of discrete things” (77). This remark, which emphasizes the fixity of the ‘things’ 
photographed, may seem like an odd fit with the more dynamic conception of the object I 
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have outlined here. Yet the images Austerlitz produces suggest a continuity between his 
fascination with physical solidity, on the one hand, and a conception of objects as always 
enmeshed in and invested by other objects. Austerlitz’s photographs, many of which are 
reproduced in the text, are often so closely cropped it is difficult or impossible to discern 
the shape of the whole. Rather than focusing on edges and outlines, details that might 
sharply delineate between object and context, Austerlitz takes as his subject matter those 
natural and human-made forms that suggest movement or flow: “the curve of banisters on 
a staircase, the molding of a stone arch over a gateway, the tangled precision of the 
blades in a tussock of dried grass” (77). Sebald’s novel, as I have suggested here, 
functions in a similar manner, staging encounters with “discrete things,” experiences, and 
histories that produce entirely new ways of looking at the world. In place of the 
empathetic human witness, locked into a one-sided relation—with a text, an object, a 
world of dead matter—Austerlitz gives us a cast-iron column and a middle-aged Jew: 
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